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Abstract
The predominant approach in visual studies, explicitly
focusing on how vision is socioculturally constructed, tends
to neglect the physiological substrate for vision. Images,
and our visual surroundings, are often considered from
the premise that those dealing with them specifically
see with average eyesight and that differences in seeing
can be accounted for by cultural and ideological analyses.
I set out to question this premise and the normalisation
of vision it implies, by drawing on accounts of seeing by
Conrad, a friend and colleague who sees with special
requirements. His well-articulated verbal description of
the requirements involved in his seeing makes it clear that
our vision is tightly intertwined with visuality. Our visual
surroundings are the way they are partially on account
of the ability to see implied. As Conrad puts it, ‘‘they are
designed for average eyesight.’’ I posit that the concept
of activated affordances is useful for taking into account
that vision is socially constructed, as suggested in impor-
tant works in visual studies, and that physiological sub-
strates for vision exhibit variation. I will focus particularly
on how the designed environment becomes an area
for Conrad in which visuality is lived out differently in
accordance with how this eyesight happens to manifest
itself. Conrad’s use of ‘‘social hacks’’ provides a case in
point for discussing how Conrad activates affordances
in unforeseen ways, in order to fulfil desires for socially
meaningful action that does not reduce him to stereo-
typical behaviour when being treated as visually impaired.
Maintaining that vision and visuality remain difficult to
disentangle, I will argue that we all see with special require-
ments, even if we might not notice this. For studies of
visuality, I suggest reflecting on presumed understandings
of vision. The argument in textual form is complemented
with a brief video that features an edited interview focusing
on Conrad’s account of seeing with special requirements.
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A short film Seeing with special requirements by
Asko Lehmuskallio.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9I7c8EHBkhQ
&feature=youtu.be
The dominant approach in visual studies, expli-
citly focusing on how vision is socially constructed,
tends to neglect the physiological substrate for
vision. Studies both of images and of our visual
surroundings often proceed from an implicit pre-
mise that those dealing with them see with average
eyesight and that differences in seeing can be
accounted for by cultural and ideological analyses.
Here, I question this premise and the normal-
isation of vision implied, by drawing on accounts of
seeing offered by Conrad, a friend and colleague
who sees with special requirements. As his eloquent
verbalisation of the requirements for seeing makes
clear, our vision is closely intertwined with visual-
ity.1 In part, our visual surroundings are the way they
are because of the ability to see implied. As Conrad
puts it, ‘‘they are designed for average eyesight.’’
In the discussion that follows, I will focus parti-
cularly on how the designed environment becomes
an area where visuality is lived out differently de-
pending on the kind of eyesight one happens to
have. I wish to argue that we all see with special
requirements, and that our requirements linked
to seeing differ, depending on our physiological
substrate for vision. When attending to designed
environments, we situationally adapt to prescribed
ways of seeing that are culturally and ideologically
formed. I suggest that the concept of activated
affordances is helpful for taking into account both
the physiological substrate for vision needed for
seeing and the cultural and ideological formations
that suggest which affordances get activated in-
stead of others.
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The argument in textual form is complemented
by a brief video that includes an edited inter-
view focusing on an account of seeing with special
requirements. The interview is supported with
visualisations intended to render aspects of Conrad’s
seeing. Instead of claiming to visualise exactly
how Conrad sees, I use the imagery to stimulate
reflection of seeing as a complex process, mediated
via both our ability to see and the social construc-
tion of what to see.3
A PARADOX IN VISUAL STUDIES: THE
NORMALISATION OF VISION
In a well-regarded preface to an edited work on
vision and visuality, Hal Foster explains how scopic
regimes seek to essentialise vision, naturalising and
normalising a certain way to see. He maintains that
although vision is based on physiological processes,
it is also very much culturally and socially in-
formed. Sight and its techniques intertwine in ways
that make them difficult to disentangle, whereas
vision and visuality remain woven together.4
Much of the important and influential work
published in visual culture studies tends to focus
on the latter, the social construction of practices
related to vision and visuality, emphasising ways
in which power structures, visual orders, scopic
regimes, and various gazes direct our attention,
our ways of looking, and the meanings that we give
to what we see. In doing so, they situate observers,
subjects, or bodies within nuanced patterns of
power-laden and structured visual interactions.5
These studies explicitly work with the social
construction of vision and constitute attempts
It is supported with visualisations representing an attempt
to render aspects of his seeing. Instead of purporting to
visualise exactly how he sees, I intend the imagery to provoke
reflection of seeing as a complex process, mediated via our
ability to see and by the social construction of what to see.
This paper is part of the Special Issue: Visual Frictions. More papers from this issue can be found at www.aestheticsandculture.net
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to uncover asymmetric power structures and to
counter them. While doing so, much of this work
takes implicitly a particular physiological substrate
of vision for granted, although influential figures
such as Foster or Mitchell warn against doing so.6
In many of these studies, pictures and the mental
images they occasion are deemed so powerful
because people can see them. Studies on visual
culture seldom reflect from this perspective the
premises behind their work; paradoxically, it seems
that much of the work explicitly questioning a
normalised visuality as socially constructed nor-
malises the physiological substrate of vision.7
I suggest that the concept of activated affordances
is useful for understanding the intertwinement
of vision and visuality, of how bodies and their
environments merge within seeing, helping to point
both towards affordances as a relation needed for
seeing in the first place and to their activation as a
particular cultural form of attention and meaning-
making.
James J. Gibson coined the term affordance
to discuss the complementarity of animals and
persons with their environments.8 Affordances, in
Gibson’s understanding, always describe relations
between living beings and their particular environ-
ments, and these relations depend both on the
living beings and on the environments in question.
For example, a small mobile phone screen is per-
ceivable, readable, and therefore usable for text
messaging by those with sufficiently good eyesight
(for perception and reading) and adequate motor
skills (for texting) but not, for example, by many
elderly individuals with poor eyesight. The latter
can perceive the mobile phone’s screen but, be-
cause of both poor eyesight and the limited screen
size, cannot read it. The mobile phone does not
afford them the same kinds of uses it affords others.
Gibson’s use of the notion of affordance is of
assistance for pointing towards the relationality
and variety of affordances, but he does not give
culturally sensitive explanations addressing why
some affordances are preferred over others.
For accounting for cultural contextualisations,
it is useful to think of activated affordances if one
wishes to comprehend the actual use of particular
objects, and how their use is embedded in social
meanings, as Gillian Rose has proposed in her
work on everyday photography.9 The focus on the
activation of affordances is useful for pointing to
culturally meaningful ways of interacting in visual
environments. In Conrad’s case, as will be shown
later, there is, for example, an explicit activation of
coarse-level visual features of friends and collea-
gues for purposes of identifying them (among these
are hair type/style, colour of clothing, and ways of
walking), because this kind of activation of affor-
dances is socially meaningful. Being able to identify
someone as an individual person is very much en-
couraged, at least in the so-called Western socie-
ties, and, for doing so, some affordances have to
be activated rather than others. The affordances
available depend, again, not only on the social
construction of seeing but also, just as much, on
the particular ways in which we are able to see.
Conrad’s account of the visual frictions encoun-
tered in his everyday life is useful for a discussion
on how the affordances activated depend both
on socially meaningful action and on the physical
opportunities for action available to each of us.
Mitchell has importantly pointed out that ‘‘[i]t is
not just that we see the way we do because we are
social animals, but also that our social arrange-
ments take the forms they do because we are seeing
animals.’’10 Unfortunately for those seeing with
special requirements, many social environments
continue to be designed with average eyesight in
mind.
SEEING WITH SPECIAL
REQUIREMENTS
Conrad provides a good example for a discussion
on this possible normalisation of vision and the way
in which it rests on particular assumptions about
visualities, especially regarding designed environ-
ments. Many do not necessarily recognise that
Conrad is visually impaired, because he tends to
act and talk in ways that do not distinguish him
from most others. Although he wears thick eye-
glasses, it is not clear to many people that he
actually sees very differently than many others do.
Whereas he is thus able to ‘‘blend in’’ in diverse
situations, he does so by activating other affor-
dances than most people with average eyesight do.
Where this possibility is not available, he finds that
many have a hard time even believing him to need
help when he expresses this need.
I have many situations in which people don’t
really realize how much I see, because I have
so many tricks, and I hack myself through life
somehow. So a lot of times when I tell them
Seeing with special requirements
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I am visually impaired, they sort of don’t
believe me, and that is a really big problem
for me when I try to achieve accessibility or
equal behavior, or something like that.11
Conrad has created social hacks, particular acti-
vations of affordances that enable him to interact
such that his special requirements in seeing are not
that readily noticed. These social hacks provide
him with a way of rendering his behaviour in front
of others so that his actions are not constrained
beforehand for reason of his vision. When acting as
yet another person who sees as everyone else does,
and thereby as someone who is able to navigate
built environments and social situations as those
with average eyesight do, Conrad allows himself
to be drawn into situations that he might not enter
if others made judgements in keeping with his
impairments in vision.
Conrad would not differ from most other people
if his visual system were more commonplace. His
use of the concept of seeing with special require-
ments implies that all human beings have parti-
cular requirements for their sensory perception
and action upon the environment, and that these
requirements differ from person to person, just as
Gibson suggests with the notion of affordance.
As the examples Conrad cites from his life ex-
perience make clear, many designed environments
are geared towards those with average eyesight,
disrupting their use by people with different visual
systems. Even everyday utility articles and artefacts
such as computers, houses, or cars are often de-
signed for people with normalised, average vision.
Conrad points out:
[I]f they would be just slightly changed
in their designs to meet my requirements,
I wouldn’t have so many problems actually
getting around in the world. If I use the
term ’people with special requirements’, it
always implies that it’s not my fault that
I can’t do this thing at the moment or can’t
operate this machine or that it takes much
longer, but it’s actually the fault of the
design, because [the problematic element
or item] wasn’t designed for my require-
ments but was designed for someone else’s
requirements.
Here, vision and visuality intertwine in ways that
show how a variety of designed environments rely
on an assumption of average eyesight, a necessary
condition for taking up a relation, an affordance, in
the first place. Thus, designed artefacts are socially
constructed to fit the requirements of particular
kinds of people.12 Slight changes in designed en-
vironments could enable a better fit between
Conrad’s body and the material artefacts around
him, but designed environments tend to be oriented
towards normalised vision rather than allowing
for other kinds of activations, such as Conrad’s
social hacks discussed below.13 Whereas, as Gibson
suggests, these differences between individuals
may vary significantly, too often there is the ten-
dency to think in discreet binaries, such as normal
and special, leading to design decisions that do not
take variety into account.14 Acknowledging we all
have special requirements in seeing is helpful for
deconstructing this binary opposition.
FLUID BOUNDARIES OF THE BODY
We need a particular physiological substrate for vision
if we are to act in environments designed for average
eyesight.15 Perhaps, because of the need to adapt to
these environments in order to participate in the
diverse social interactions presented, devices that
allow eyesight that is closer to average eyesight can
be felt to be almost as necessary as parts of the body,
as is the case with Conrad. Devices modifying our
bodies can afford seeing and acting in environments
designed for average eyesight: One’s body has to be
moulded if it is to fit these designed environments.
Conrad makes this relation explicit by stating that
‘‘my glasses are not really an object for me; they are
more a part of my body like an arm or something
like that.’’ His eyeglasses enable him to partake in
meaningful social relations, to activate affordances he
would not be able to activate without them.
The boundaries of his body are described as not
neatly contained but, rather, fluid, such that some
material artefacts can be felt to be, in essence, body
parts, not that different from an arm or fingers, for
example. This understanding provides an example
suitable for advancing the thesis of relationality
of affordances, particularly addressing how the
designed environments we act upon might mould
and modify both our bodies and our understand-
ings of them. This fluidity of bodily boundaries
becomes understandable when the role of our
bodies as a medium for action is underscored, as
done in theories of media put forth by John
Durham Peters and Hans Belting, among others.16
Our bodies, once moulded, afford novel relations
A. Lehmuskallio
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to our environments, a novel fit, and this novel fit
might be achieved through glasses, mobile phones,
and/or other kinds of artefacts, effectively enabling
the distribution and mediation of our selves.17
Action in environments designed for the re-
quirements of average eyesight necessitates media
that facilitate it. For some, the physical body itself
provides a sufficient medium for doing so, being
capable of adapting to the requirements of average
eyesight in various environments; however, ever
more people need specially fabricated eyewear in
order to achieve fit with their environments. There
is constant need for spectacles, contact lenses, and
other media for being able to see in environments
designed for average eyesight.
SOCIAL HACKS
Although Conrad’s glasses feel more like a part of
the body for him, he continues to see differently
than those who by wearing spectacles approximate
normal vision. When using eyeglasses, he must still
rely on more prominent features of the people and
objects he perceives, thereby explicitly activating
affordances that he can rely upon in order to act in
a socially meaningful way.
Normally, I can’t recognise people by their
face when they are decently far away, so I use
a lot of rough features, like what their body
structure looks like, what kind of hairstyle
they have, and how they walk. I even try to
remember what clothes they wear. It’s easy to
recognise people by how they walk, because
a lot of people walk very distinctively. When
they move their upper torso, or even how the
body proportions are, how long the legs are
and so forth. It all influences how people walk,
so this makes it very easy for me to recognise
people. [. . .] I’m very conscious about that.
Body movements, colour of clothing, and hair-
style become particularly important since they
remain recognisable cues for Conrad. Although
those with average eyesight too notice these aspects
of those they interact with, this often remains
implicit and has to be brought up directly before it
is considered, as has been discussed with regard to
habitus.18
This friction in fitting within designed environ-
ments and social situations whose assumptions rely
on average eyesight calls particularly in unfamiliar
situations for Conrad’s so-called social hacking,
a particular way of activating affordances, allowing
him to explore novel kinds of relations that enable
him to circumvent his special requirements. In
social hacking, Conrad activates other affordances
than people with average eyesight do, with the
intention to approximate a socially accepted beha-
viour that does not reveal his visual impairment.
When I go through the world, one technique
that I use is that I always ask people a lot of
things if I can’t see it or get that information
at the moment. So I would even ask indir-
ectly whether something is going on in the
street. If I don’t see what’s going on, I ask
people what it is.
Ordering food at a restaurant might be such a
situation. If it is Conrad’s first time at the restau-
rant and its offerings are not known to him
beforehand, Conrad has to rely on a variety of
techniques that those with average eyesight do not
need. Since he is often unable to read the menu,
which where we met (in San Francisco’s Bay Area)
was often behind the counter, Conrad has to
socially hack. Because he cannot identify what is
on offer, he has to ask for recommendations, order
what someone else is eating or has ordered, just
point at some food, or ask about food for special
diets (such as vegetarian food). These social hacks
circumvent the problem that designed environ-
ments do not always afford him the same informa-
tion that these environments do for those with
average eyesight. Many of these social hacks might
be used by those with average eyesight as well, but
then for other reasons than not being able to read
the menu behind the counter.
Also, computation devices allow Conrad to
gather information about upcoming situations,
helping him navigate in environments he cannot
see. These devices allow Conrad to plan some of
his actions in advance, so that he knows how to act
in social situations that entail partial reliance on
average eyesight. One of his situational social
hacks is to look up the menu of a restaurant on
that venue’s Web site before going there, so that he
knows what is available.
The role that these devices receive in Conrad’s
day-to-day life has become very intimate, since
they help him to expand his experiences of the
environment, affording him relations he might not
engage in without them. As Conrad points out,
these devices become a bit like friends, in that they
facilitate his every day.
Seeing with special requirements
5
(page number not for citation purpose)
They help me a lot, I give an input and the
machine replies. All of them actually have a
name: my computer, my phone, my Kindle.
I name them. They are active, they reply to
what I say.
Whereas, for Conrad, eyeglasses feel like a part
of the body, computation devices end up taking on
social roles, since they are even more integral to the
many social situations he can navigate with their
aid. Both glasses and computation devices enable
him to activate affordances in designed environ-
ments that otherwise do not fit his requirements.
CONCLUSIONS
Conrad’s account of visual frictions in the course
of his everyday life provides a case in point for
considering how the physiological substrate for
vision and the social construction of visuality are
intertwined. The notion of activated affordances is
helpful for stressing the relationality between these
two with regard to the particular environments
under discussion, by enabling particular attention
to be paid to why some affordances are activated
instead of others. Conrad’s use of social hacking
is a way to circumvent some of the restrictions he
has for activating affordances in environments
designed for those with average eyesight. In social
hacking, Conrad seeks to activate other affordances
in order to act in socially acceptable and mean-
ingful ways, without having to take up the role of
being visually impaired. Instead, he can act along
with others taking other primary social roles, such
as that of a student, an employee, or a young man,
for example.
For studies in visual culture, this case provides
examples for considering both the role of embo-
died practices and that of material environments
for grasping vision and visuality. Presentation of
this material in textual form and also as a multi-
media narrative allows for the depiction of slightly
different readings, which get experienced differ-
ently. In line with who the reader or viewer is, this
text and the accompanying video afford different
kinds of relations, and perhaps some of these might
get activated in unforeseen ways.
With his eloquent descriptions of how he experi-
ences his surroundings, Conrad reminds me of how
we all deal with special requirements, all the time.
Vision tests might prove that I see in a manner
conforming to the ideals behind these tests, but the
test results say little about the variance in seeing
that we all experience. Aching, sore eyes after a day
at a monitor or when out in the wind; the eyelids
closing when one is trying to remain awake; and
the assault of brightness after a night in the dark
woods all are ways of seeing that entail a need to
adapt to designed environments if one wants to
take up a relation with them, thus activating an
affordance.
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